of 'confronting, deterring, and, if necessary, disarming states that brandish and use weapons of mass destruction. '5 At the government level, Bill Clinton's administration adopted a counter-proliferation policy which included coercive strategies. Although the policy emphasizes such traditional approaches to non-proliferation as diplomacy, arms control, economic and security assistance, and export controls, a new element has been added: an increased Pentagon capacity to detect, disable, and dismantle nuclear weapons and incapacitate research facilities which produce weapons of mass destruction in proliferating states.6 The Pentagon would be given a role in devising measures to destroy or deter nuclear weapons not only at an advanced stage but also during the early phases of devel- Although the problem of proliferation existed throughout the Cold War, the end of East-West rivalry has raised the issue to a higher salience in the policy objectives of the United States. The new strategic environment poses challenges to the existing international order because states traditionally perceived as weak and underdeveloped could, over time, acquire nuclear capability and delivery systems which can strike distant targets.8 Analysts debate the need for maintaining United States primacy in the next century even by such means as active external intervention. Arresting nuclear proliferation has been viewed as an essential step in forestalling the rise of new great-power challengers.9
Moreover, loopholes in the nuclear non-proliferation regime made it possible for some signatories of the npt, such as Iraq, North Korea, Iran, and Libya, to pursue clandestine nuclear weapons programmes, even as they remained parties to the treaty. Giving coercive powers to the Security Council would give iaea safeguards more credibility and violations of npt responsibilities a strong legal basis for coercive action.
This article evaluates the strategy of strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation regime through coercive means. It looks at two types of coercion, economic and military, and analyzes the conditions under which each might succeed or fail in light of the lessons learned from coercive policies against Iraq and North Korea. It also examines the likely long-term implications of sanctions for the non-proliferation regime.
8 As Krauthammer put it: 'in a shrunken world the divide between regional superpowers and great powers is radically narrowed ... Missiles shrink distance. Nuclear ... devices multiply power.' 'The unipolar moment,' 30. 9 Christopher Layne, 'The unipolar illusion: why new great powers will rise,'
COERCIVE POLICY INSTRUMENTS
Although various types of coercive policy mechanisms are available to decision-makers in strong states for use against smaller target states, in the non-proliferation arena the two most relevant options are economic sanctions and military threat-based strategies, including coercive diplomacy, compellence, and preventive strikes.10 Blockades could also be a part of sanctions. The rationale and assumptions for including nuclear spread as a legitimate reason for coercive intervention are manifold. First, proliferation constitutes a threat to international peace and security. Notwithstanding the dispute over whether the spread of nuclear weapons to other states can be a stabilizing factor, those who advocate coercive approaches assume that nuclear proliferation is an inherently dangerous process. If war broke out among nuclear-armed regional adversaries, it could escalate into an atomic exchange which would result not only in incalculable death and destruction of the belligerents, but also in nuclear contamination of the environment of other countries. The state that engages in nuclear acquisition, especially if it is a member of the npt, is, therefore, seen as violating the widely accepted norm of international conduct that nuclear weapons should not spread to other countries.
A second rationale could be that the target state is acquiring nuclear weapons not because of security threats, since a significant nuclear challenge is remote in most cases, but because of narrow objectives, such as domestic power calculations or regional power ambitions. Even when security concerns are genuine, nuclear acquisitions would pose an even greater threat to international and regional stability and to the maintenance of the non-proliferation regime. In other words, protecting inter-10 Anticipation of hostile response by allies and adversaries, arms transfers, security guarantees, arms control measures, fuel supply assurances, strengthened safeguards, and export controls are traditionally viewed as significant influences on a country's choice to refrain from nuclear acqui- national non-proliferation norms embodied in the npt and the iaea safeguards system, however unequal they may be, takes precedence over national considerations of military security. Third, it is assumed that a state's behaviour can be altered by the coercing power, which has the advantage of balance of forces and, in some cases, balance of resolve and balance of interests. The proliferating state is likely to back down in the face of economic hardship or the potential destruction of its nuclear facilities by military attack. Also, its incentive structure could be altered if the economic and political costs and technical difficulties of renewing its nuclear weapons programme outweigh the benefits. Therefore, the leaders of at least some target states would prudently refrain from such actions.
Fourth, the possession of technology and fissile materials is the driving force behind the incentives for nuclear weapons acquisition. Therefore, if existing capabilities can be destroyed or thoroughly safeguarded and if new technology to restart the nuclear programme is denied, the state with nuclear ambitions would not find the enterprise worthwhile and would likely give up the nuclear weapons option eventually.
Fifth, coercive instruments, especially technological and material sanctions and preventive strikes, could prolong the period required for nuclear acquisition. During that period, political or diplomatic conditions could change which would make nuclear abstinence a possibility.11 A regime change could occur, and the new leadership might decide to abandon the nuclear weapons programme. Coercive actions could convince suppliers to provide no further materials or to cease collaborating in any way for fear of further retaliatory actions. For example, after the Israeli attack on Osiraq, Iraqi negotiations with Italy for a heavy water reactor and a reprocessing facility came 1 1 For instance, Israel justified its strike on Iraq's Osiraq reactor on the grounds that it would provide time for the peace process to make major strides before Arab countries gained nuclear weapons and for Israel to take sufficient counter-measures. It would also give Arab leaders time to consider the consequences of the nuclear arms race. target state is diverting nuclear materials for weapons programmes, or a threat of attack on a country's nuclear facilities, safeguarded or not, to put an end to its efforts to acquire nuclear weapons. Such policies can include carrots as well as sticks: co-operation may be induced through promises of aid if the target state modifies its behaviour.83
At the bilateral level, states that engage in coercive tactics could invoke international law, on the basis of 'anticipatory selfdefence,' by arguing that the weapons that are being developed by the adversary will eventually be used against it or its allies.84 Article 51 of the United Nations Charter gives states the right to resort to individual or collective self-defence in the event of an armed attack against a member state, the intention being that the Security Council will eventually undertake measures necessary for the maintenance of peace and security. However, nations could resort to anticipatory self-defence by contending that since 'nuclear, chemical and biological weapons are capable of sudden and mass destruction, states must not only wonder whether the Security Council will act on their behalf, but whether such assistance, if offered at all, will arrive too late.' Therefore, national leaders could resort to pre-emptive and preventive attacks if they 'perceive a significant threat to their national security' from an adversary attempting to acquire nuclear weapons. uct, the flow of two-way trade as a percentage of total trade, the relative economic size of the country, and the type of sanctions and their cost to the coercive state.88 It should be noted that only eleven of the cases in this study dealt with non-proliferation issues and in a majority sanctions were not particularly effective. Selective sanctions can hurt key aspects of a country's nuclear energy programme. However, if perceived and actual security challenges are overwhelming, the country may pursue its nuclear option regardless. Economic sanctions against trade in arms have not forced Pakistan to abandon its nuclear acquisition efforts. India is perceived as such an enormous security threat that the Pakistani elite acquired all the components necessary for a nuclear weapons programme through clandestine means. Nor is there any substantive evidence that sanctions imposed on India after its 1974 nuclear explosion did anything to reduce the determination of India's leaders to acquire nuclear capability in the face of a perceived overwhelming security threat from China and Pakistan. It is, however, possible that the fear of economic sanctions contributed to India's decision to conduct no further tests or to declare openly its nuclear weapons activities. The sanctions imposed on South Africa did not have a major effect during the apartheid regime, when a 'total onslaught' mentality pervaded the South African elite's security perceptions -hence their clandestine nuclear weapons programme. Only with the demise of apartheid did the npt become acceptable to South Africa. However, positive assurances, coupled with active diplomacy, have produced results in other cases. United States diplomacy vis-a-vis North Korea was somewhat successful, but only after an economic and security incentive package was offered.
While it is possible that sanctions might have a long-term impact, it is difficult to prove that they are the reason for nonacquisition of nuclear weapons because so many factors affect national choices. However, if one begins with a benign security 28 Ibid, 40. environment, the impact of the threat of sanctions is easier to assess. It could be argued that Brazil and Argentina gave up nuclear weapons programmes largely for economic reasons. Both countries are in a low-conflict zone with no major compelling security reasons to acquire nuclear weapons other than prestige and domestic politics. The civilian regimes of both countries saw the removal of the nuclear irritant as necessary to attract foreign investment and to increase foreign trade. However, sanctions against a potential proliferator in a protracted conflict zone without a nuclear ally are unlikely to succeed, particularly if the proliferator is an isolated state. In the case of fencer-sitters, the threat of sanctions might deter them from pursuing an all-out nuclear programme. The successful application of sanctions could also increase international and institutionalized co-operation in this area.89
One important implication of coercive sanctions is the ten- Because it had not succeeded in assembling a workable bomb at the time of the preventive strikes against it, Iraq was a relatively easy target. But it is highly unlikely that coercive tactics would succeed against a country that already possessed one or more hidden nuclear weapons. Coercive tactics against such a country would lack credibility.40 Threats of attack would not be easy to put into practice if the target state already possessed nuclear weapons because its response to attack would be highly unpredictable and the danger of escalation would be great. For Second, any attempt by the United Nations to focus on a few small and vulnerable countries, while ignoring a number of others, including the present five nuclear powers and the opaque states, would be tantamount to a new kind of 'atomic colonialism.' Any discriminatory order contains the seeds of its own destruction. Norms sustained over a long period often have to be non-discriminatory in application and beneficial to a large number of participants in some form or another.
Third, since the United Nations does not have the military force to implement a selective ban on nuclear acquisition, it might have to seek the help of one or more of the present nuclear powers, most likely the United States. A United Nations force drawn largely from the United States would result in further unfairness because Washington would have no incentive to employ coercive diplomacy against its allies or states with which it wanted to maintain friendly relations.
Fourth, the npt contains a provision which allows states to withdraw from it if their supreme national interests dictate that they do so. Thus, in a strictly legal sense, any state can threaten to withdraw under this provision. North Korea is a case in point.44 CONCLUSIONS By the mid-1990s, nuclear proliferation was confined to a small group of middle ranking states engaged in protracted conflicts or on-going rivalries with their neighbours. If they fear that their conventional capability does not provide the necessary deterrent, nuclear weapons could be an option. If they also fear that they could become targets of future interventions from outside powers, nuclear weapons could become attractive. Regimes that value nuclear arms for their own survival will not be easily deterred by economic sanctions. Nonetheless, the threat of sanctions could raise the threshold of conditions necessary for a state to embrace a nuclear weapons programme. If security challenges are not intense, the benefits of nuclear acquisition would be minimal compared to the economic and political costs and the potential damage to reputations. Sustained sanctions could also undermine the legitimacy of a state's nuclear weapons programme. International efforts since the 1970s have made it difficult for countries to declare their nuclear weapons programmes openly.
In fact, non-proliferation has been slowly emerging as an area of international consensus, largely because of a tacit agreement among the major powers that violators of the npt are a challenge to their dominance of the international system. All great powers, including China and France, have joined hands to maintain their systemic monopoly which satisfies one condition of success for the regime, at least in the near term. Nonetheless, the overwhelming regional interests of one or more major powers could prevent a sanctions-based regime from emerging. China's refusal to join in sanctions against North Korea or to stop supplying nuclear materials and missiles to Pakistan, despite the threat of United States sanctions, is a prominent example. The difficulty in achieving consensus on punishing violations and obtaining compliance with npt norms is evident in the failure of various npt review conferences to deal with this issue.
Despite their political appeal, coercive policies have serious limitations as a credible universal option to nuclear non-proliferation. They are highly context-dependent instruments, if and when they succeed. In the nuclear realm, coercion may be applied only to a state that has not yet assembled nuclear weapons. Even if such strategies, especially preventive attacks, work in the short run, in the long term they may increase the target state's determination to acquire nuclear weapons. State choices are heavily dependent on perceived security threats. If these considerations outweigh any potential benefits of compliance, states would pursue the nuclear route even after a preventive attack takes place. Those who renounce the nuclear option because of such factors as * nuclear allergy* would do so without coercive threats. Limited coercive tactics may backfire and push a country further along the road to nuclear acquisition. Moreover, until a non-discriminatory and universal regime can be devised, sanctions will remain political and economic tools in the hands of powerful states and would thus be imposed only selectively upon those states that are not allies. A non-discriminatory non-proliferation regime, based on universal membership and strong standards of compliance, could change this. Major and minor states would then have an equal interest in preventing the emergence of a nuclear renegade state, and both economic and military sanctions would become more effective.
